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COMMENT 
How the Rise of the Daily Fantasy Sports 
Industry Can Catalyze the Liberalization of 
Sports Betting Policies in the United States 
BRENDAN F. CONLEY† 
It is a crisp Sunday afternoon in the autumn of 2015, and 
football fanatics from all across the United States, and the 
world, are situated in front of their high definition television 
sets, anxiously awaiting the kickoff of their favorite National 
Football League (NFL) team’s game. Hope abounds, and 
significant playoff implications permeate the weekend slate 
of games. Yet, for millions of these fans, attention quickly 
shifts elsewhere. 
For these individuals, it is standard to find laptop 
computers positioned adjacent to them on the sofa, open to 
FanDuel’s “Live” page, whereby they can continuously 
monitor the progress of their lineups—or “entries”—in the 
variety of different “contests” offered on the site, if they so 
choose. However, their immediate attention is still 
elsewhere. To be sure, the home team’s game remains on in 
the background, and these individuals are still vaguely 
attuned to what is taking place on the field, but their eyes 
are truly fixated on their laptops and mobile devices. By now, 
having fully committed the players in their various fantasy 
lineups to memory, these devices become precious sources of 
the real-time information, upon which the hopes and dreams 
of this group of daily fantasy football participants will 
subsequently rise and fall. 
As the third quarter of the home team’s game concludes, 
 
† Note & Comment Editor, Buffalo Law Review. 
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the national broadcast transitions to a commercial break and 
yet another advertisement for DraftKings, FanDuel’s 
primary competitor, flickers onto the screen and depicts 
seemingly everyday people winning life-altering cash 
payouts. The commercial concludes with the now-familiar 
phrase: “This isn’t fantasy as usual. This is DraftKings. 
Welcome to the big time.”1 
At this point, while games across the country move to the 
fourth quarter, the daily fantasy player’s attention oscillates 
between nervously checking the up-to-the-minute scoring 
status of their active lineups and intently studying the out-
of-town scores, game situations, and player statistics via 
their preferred smartphone applications. All these 
individuals can do is idly watch, as their financial fortunes 
are determined by what is taking place in NFL stadiums 
located thousands of miles away. It is a helpless feeling, yet 
it is also utterly captivating. 
In these moments, the allocation of thousands of dollars 
will oftentimes quite literally turn on a single yard gained or 
lost. One touchdown can mean the difference between 
winning hundreds of thousands of dollars and 
unceremoniously losing the entirety of an entry fee with 
nothing to show for the time, energy, and money spent in the 
process. None of this is impervious to human error either: a 
poorly spotted football, an improper penalty call, or a 
statistician’s error can be the deciding factor when the 
margins between victory and defeat are this slim. Daily 
fantasy players are fully cognizant of the imperfect nature of 
the game, particularly on afternoons such as this one, but 
they also realize they are all playing under the same 
umbrella of uncertainty. And one of them is about to become 
a millionaire. 
As the game clocks begin to wind down around the 
 
 1. Don Van Natta Jr., Welcome to the Big Time, ESPN MAG. (Aug. 24, 2016), 
http://www.espn.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/17374929/otl-investigates-implosio
n-daily-fantasy-sports-leaders-draftkings-fanduel. 
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league, the daily fantasy player’s anxiety is palpable. But, for 
as stressful as it can be at times, there is also a certain thrill 
that comes with being along for the ride on these Sunday 
afternoons. The adrenaline rush has an addictive quality to 
it, and the hope of potentially winning an enormous cash 
payout can be intoxicating, whereas the defeats can be 
bitterly disappointing. 
This all feels an awful lot like gambling. But how could 
it be? FanDuel and DraftKings have both very publicly been 
permitted to grow into billion-dollar enterprises2 over the 
course of several years,3 and they combine to feature high-
profile sponsorship deals with the National Basketball 
Association (NBA), National Hockey League (NHL), and 
Major League Baseball (MLB).4 Two prominent NFL 
franchise owners—Dallas Cowboys owner Jerry Jones and 
New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft—even have 
equity stakes in DraftKings.5 The two companies have each 
spent millions of dollars on advertisements, including 
signage in NFL stadiums across the country6 and, perhaps 
most notably, television commercials that air every ninety 
seconds, on average.7 So, despite ostensibly displaying many 
of the traditional features of illegal online gambling 
operations, it seems unfathomable to think that these daily 
fantasy sports companies could get away with such a brash 
and public showing if there was any doubt whatsoever as to 
the legality of their business models. Maybe daily fantasy 
 
 2. Id.; Brad Tuttle, Why Betting on Fantasy Sports is Legal but Betting on 
Regular Sports is Not, MONEY (Sept. 10, 2015), http://time.com/money/
4029443/fantasy-sports-betting-legal/. 
 3. Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. Id.; Brent Schrotenboer, FanDuel Signs Deals with 15 NFL Teams, 
Escalating Daily Fantasy Integration, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2015, 10:42 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2015/04/21/daily-fantasy-sports-fanduel-
draftkings-nfl-mlb-nhl-nba/26149961/. 
 7. Van Natta, supra note 1. 
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sports contests really are “games of skill”8 after all . . . 
INTRODUCTION 
For several years, the daily fantasy sports industry was 
inexplicably permitted to operate under a veil of legal 
uncertainty, based largely upon the industry’s own 
conceptions and interpretations of existing federal and state 
law.9 To say that the foremost daily fantasy companies, 
FanDuel and DraftKings, had isolated some sort of legal 
loophole—through which they could build their companies 
and grow their business models—would be grossly 
misleading, for it implies a somewhat solid, if not remote and 
limited, legal footing. However, at most, these two pioneers 
of the daily fantasy industry had simply identified a legal 
gray area, a small crack in the regulatory armor targeting 
illegal online gambling operations, through which they could 
at least make an argument for the legitimacy of their 
operations; and they wasted little time in doing so. 
By creatively and strategically marketing their services 
as being akin to traditional fantasy sports products, when 
convenient, and continuously labeling them as “games of 
skill” in which the most knowledgeable and talented players 
typically prevail, the companies were largely able to 
discourage and ward off public skepticism and investigative 
scrutiny.10 This was done while simultaneously juxtaposing 
that public approach with their pitches to investors behind 
closed doors, which would often allude to the similarities 
between the daily fantasy business models and those of 
 
 8. Id. Noting that, even in early meetings, FanDuel’s founder, Nigel Eccles, 
“was a passionate evangelist for daily fantasy sports as a game of skill . . . .” 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. (noting that the companies existed in the same legislative 
landscape for several years, during which time they branded themselves as 
games of skill publicly, while privately pitching investors on their similarities to 
traditional online gambling products). 
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traditional illegal online gambling operations.11 This was an 
extremely audacious strategy, yet it worked almost 
flawlessly for about half a decade,12 during which time 
FanDuel and DraftKings both grew into billion-dollar 
enterprises.13 
From the advent of his company, FanDuel’s chief 
executive officer, Nigel Eccles, believed that existing law 
provided a “safe harbor” for daily fantasy sports,14 although 
he did demonstrate a certain degree of wariness concerning 
the lack of uniformity in the relevant state laws.15 But, as 
each successive year came and passed without issue, those 
following the industry seemed to grow increasingly less 
concerned with any potential legality problems facing the 
daily fantasy companies. Meanwhile, the progressively 
brazen marketing behaviors of the industry leaders certainly 
exuded an aura of confidence concerning their legal 
statuses.16 Though, as it turned out, the companies’ legal 
footing was actually quite tenuous all along. 
When the day of legal reckoning finally did come for the 
daily fantasy industry, the State of New York was at the 
forefront, with State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman 
serving as the proverbial leader of the charge.17 On 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. (recognizing that FanDuel was founded in 2009, DraftKings was 
founded in 2011, and New York’s cease and desist order ultimately came in 
November 2015). 
 13. See id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. (quoting Eccles’ advice to the daily fantasy industry in which he 
warned them to “avoid the use of gambling terms in the promotion and marketing 
of their games.”). 
 16. See id. 
 17. Walt Bogdanich et al., Attorney General Tells DraftKings and FanDuel to 
Stop Taking Entries in New York, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/sports/football/draftkings-fanduel-new-yor
k-attorney-general-tells-fantasy-sites-to-stop-taking-bets-in-new-york.html; 
Drew Olanoff, NY State Rules Daily Fantasy Illegal, Ordering FanDuel and 
DraftKings to Stop Taking Bets, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 10, 2015), 
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November 10, 2015, Schneiderman sent separate letters to 
FanDuel and DraftKings requesting that both companies 
cease and desist operations in New York State.18 The letters 
went on to explain that, upon his investigation, 
Schneiderman concluded the sites were in fact online 
gambling operations, which were thereby illegal under 
Article I, Section 9 of the New York State Constitution.19 One 
week later, on November 17, 2015, the New York State Office 
of the Attorney General filed a court motion seeking a 
preliminary injunction against the two giants of the daily 
fantasy sports industry.20 
New York was technically the second state to issue a 
cease and desist order against FanDuel and DraftKings, 
thereby banning them from operating within the state.21 
However, the first state to do so, Nevada, did not act because 
of any perceived illegality with the business models of either 
company.22 In fact, daily fantasy sports are perfectly legal 
under Nevada law, provided that daily fantasy operators 
obtain a state-issued license.23 Therefore, the Nevada “ban” 
was actually a licensure dispute, since neither FanDuel nor 
DraftKings had obtained operating licenses to do business 
 
https://techcrunch.com/2015/11/10/ny-attorney-general-rules-daily-fantasy-sport
s-illegal-orders-sites-to-cease-and-desist/.Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 18. Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 19. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary 
Injunction at 3–4, 13–14, 19, People v. FanDuel, Inc., (No. 453056/15), 2015 WL 
9273711 (N.Y. Sup. Nov. 17, 2015) [hereinafter People v. FanDuel Motion]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Nigel Duara, States Crack Down on Fantasy Sports, Calling Them Games 
of Chance, Not Skill, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2016, 12:10 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ff-fantasy-sports-bans-20160102-
story.html. 
 22. Howard Stutz, Year is Shaping Up a Make or Break for Daily Fantasy 
Sports Industry, L.V. REV.-J. (Mar. 1, 2016, 1:37 PM), 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/inside-gaming/year-shaping-make-or-break-
daily-fantasy-sports-industry. 
 23. Id. (citing the Chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board as saying, 
“No one said daily fantasy sports was illegal. . . . All we said is play by the rules.”). 
2018] FANTASY SPORTS 721 
within the state.24 As such, Schneiderman’s actions in this 
matter truly were unprecedented at the time. However, 
several other states subsequently followed New York’s lead 
and proceeded to raise varying degrees of doubt regarding 
the legality of daily fantasy sports operations.25 
As more states subsequently took action with regard to 
the daily fantasy sports industry, New York remained at the 
epicenter of the issue. New York is extremely important from 
the standpoint of the daily fantasy sports companies because 
it is the second largest state market for daily fantasy in the 
country, behind only California. Just in 2015, New York 
users accounted for $267 million dollars in entry fees across 
the industry.26 Additionally, FanDuel is headquartered in 
New York,27 and as of 2016, the company employed 160 
people in its New York City offices alone.28 Therefore, having 
to cease operations in New York was a particularly 
damaging, if not outright devastating, blow to the industry 
leaders. 
In response to Schneiderman’s ban, and despite their 
bitter rivalry, FanDuel and DraftKings decided to pool their 
resources together to defend the legality of their services, 
while simultaneously and vigorously lobbying for legislative 
action that would expressly legalize daily fantasy sports in 
 
 24. Duara, supra note 21. It is, however, noteworthy that the Nevada 
Attorney General did equate daily fantasy sports with “sports pools and gambling 
games,” because, while such operations are legal in Nevada, this is not the case 
in other states. Id. 
 25. Stutz, supra note 22. 
 26. See, e.g., Dan Adams, N.Y. Assembly Passes Daily Fantasy Sports Bill, 
BOS. GLOBE (June 17, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/
2016/06/17/assembly-passes-daily-fantasy-sports-bill/wMCZKZDIHhIAwnawafd
96H/story.html. 
 27. Paul Sawers, How FanDuel Grew from Humble Scottish Startup into an 
American Fantasy Sports Giant, VENTUREBEAT (May 22, 2016, 10:38 AM), 
http://venturebeat.com/2016/05/22/how-fanduel-grew-from-humble-scottish-
startup-into-an-american-fantasy-sports-giant/. 
 28. Id. 
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contested states, such as New York.29 Eventually, the two 
industry leaders won a hard-fought and monumental victory 
when New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed Senate Bill 
8153, “An Act to Amend the Racing, Pari-Mutuel Wagering 
and Breeding Law, in Relation to the Registration and 
Regulation of Interactive Fantasy Sports Contests,” into 
law.30 The bill not only legalized daily fantasy sports in New 
York by declaring it to be a game of skill—thereby potentially 
saving the industry—but also introduced a number of 
regulations and consumer safeguards.31 The bill did not come 
without controversy though, and Eric Schneiderman’s 
complete reversal of opinion, with respect to the issue, 
invited a fair amount of criticism from anti-gambling groups 
and lobbyists.32 
This Comment will examine the rather precarious legal 
position of the daily fantasy sports industry in light of the 
recent state trend of initially opposing and prohibiting daily 
fantasy sports, and then subsequently passing legislation 
that expressly legalizes the activity—but with heavy 
regulations, consumer protection mechanisms, and state 
revenue generating devices built in.33 The analysis will begin 
in Part I of this Comment with a closer look at the origins of 
fantasy sports in the United States, the development of daily 
fantasy sports within that existing framework, and the 
perceived legal “safe harbor” that helped inspire the idea for 
daily fantasy sports, subsequently persuaded daily fantasy 
investors, and paved the way for the meteoric rises of 
FanDuel and DraftKings. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss some of the 
 
 29. Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 30. S.B. 8153, 2015–16 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2016). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See Dustin Gouker, Anti-Gambling Group Leads Lawsuit Against New 
York Daily Fantasy Sports Law, LEGAL SPORTS REP. (Oct. 5, 2016), 
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/11750/new-york-dfs-lawsuit/. 
 33. See, e.g., S.B. 8153. 
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significant events and missteps that compelled the increased 
legal scrutiny, eventually resulting in several states taking 
legal action against, or expressing their opinion on the 
illegality of, daily fantasy sports. Furthermore, this Part will 
delve into the responsorial legislation passed in several 
states, such as New York, as well as provide a closer look at 
some of the more noteworthy aspects of such legislation and 
its influence on the overall outlook for the daily fantasy 
industry across America. 
Finally, this Comment will conclude in Part III with a 
discussion of how the legislative actions in a growing number 
of states across the country, which clearly establish the 
legality of daily fantasy sports at the state level can, and 
should, serve as both a template and catalyst for the 
increased liberalization of sports gambling policies 
throughout the United States, at both the state and federal 
levels, provided that the remaining legal impediments to 
such liberalization are ultimately surmounted. Chief among 
these impediments is the applicable federal prohibition on 
state-sanctioned sports betting under the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), the 
constitutionality of which is currently being challenged by 
the State of New Jersey before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the case of Murphy v. NCAA. Both PASPA and New Jersey’s 
Tenth Amendment challenge of the statute will be discussed, 
at length, infra. 
I. THE ADVENT OF DAILY FANTASY SPORTS IN AMERICA 
This Part will briefly chronicle the development of 
fantasy sports, in the United States, and discuss the origins 
of daily fantasy sports, against this backdrop. This will 
necessarily include taking a closer look at the existing 
legislative and regulatory environment that the pioneers of 
the daily fantasy industry sought entry into, and in fact 
believed to be particularly conducive to both garnering initial 
acceptance and promoting the longevity of their fantasy 
products and services, from a legal standpoint. 
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A. The Origins of Fantasy Sports 
Today, fantasy sports are a cultural institution, firmly 
entrenched in modern American society. In fact, in 2016, 
roughly fifty-seven million Americans actively participated 
in fantasy sports leagues.34 It was not always such a popular 
activity, however, and the earliest forms of these contests 
would likely be largely unrecognizable to a twenty-first 
century fantasy sports aficionado. 
The origins of fantasy sports can be traced all the way 
back to 1941, when Ethan Allen, a former professional 
baseball player, partnered with the Cadaco-Ellis game 
company to devise a board game called “All-Star Baseball.”35 
All-Star Baseball was the first successful attempt at 
incorporating the on-field game performances of real-life 
athletes into a game format.36 The game, in its original and 
most basic conception, involved replicating a given player’s 
past statistical performances on a round disk.37 Each disk 
would then be divided into fourteen segments or “wedges,” 
which were numbered one through fourteen, with each 
number corresponding to a different possible outcome for a 
given plate appearance.38 The wedges would then be 
adjusted to reflect a player’s actual performance tendencies. 
For instance, a home-run hitter would have a significantly 
larger home-run wedge, as compared with a player who 
typically hits mostly singles, and vice versa.39 The disks 
would then be placed on a spinner, which would determine 
 
 34. Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 35. Ethan Allen, Cadaco-Ellis, and All-Star Baseball, BASEBALL GAMES, 
http://baseballgames.dreamhosters.com/CadacoASB.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 
2017). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
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the outcome of each “at-bat.”40 All-Star Baseball quickly 
became immensely popular amongst baseball fans, and new 
renditions of the game (updated to reflect changing player 
rosters and statistical performances) would be produced 
annually for fifty years thereafter.41 
Later, in 1961, Hal Richman, a mathematics student at 
Bucknell University, conceived of a more complex—but still 
statistically oriented—recreational baseball game, which he 
called “Strat-O-Matic Baseball.”42 Similar to All-Star 
Baseball, Strat-O-Matic enabled participants to construct 
lineups and simulate outcomes, relying on past player 
statistical performances.43 The primary differences between 
the two games were that Strat-O-Matic utilized more 
complicated result tables and it also incorporated dice rolls, 
as opposed to spins. Notwithstanding these relatively minor 
differences, Strat-O-Matic baseball caught on quickly and 
developed a fiercely loyal following, just as its predecessor 
had over the prior two decades.44 
The one major deficiency in both of these early renditions 
of fantasy sports games was that neither game enabled 
players to demonstrate their abilities to predict future 
performances.45 Both Strat-O-Matic and All-Star Baseball 
were exclusively reliant on past events and player 
performances in order to model and estimate what would 
probably occur. However, neither game model incorporated 
what actually did occur at present or future times. In 
response to this perceived deficiency, Bill Gamson, a 
psychology professor at Harvard University and the 
 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Fantasy Sports and the Law: How 
America Regulates its National Pastime, 3 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 4–5 
(2012). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 5. 
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University of Michigan, devised a forward-looking baseball 
game in the early 1960’s, which he referred to as “The 
Baseball Seminar.”46 This was the first known simulation 
game that bore a significant resemblance to the modern-day 
manifestations of fantasy sports.47 
Gamson’s “Baseball Seminar” required participants to 
pay a ten-dollar entry fee, at which point they could draft a 
roster of Major League Baseball players.48 The winner of the 
Baseball Seminar—and presumably the pool of entry fee 
money—was the participant whose roster of baseball players 
performed the best in a pre-determined set of statistical 
categories, over the course of the baseball season.49 The 
Baseball Seminar was originally a relatively secretive 
pastime, confined to Gamson’s inner circle of academic 
friends and colleagues. However, in early 1965, one of the 
original participants in the Baseball Seminar, a journalism 
and film studies professor at the University of Michigan by 
the name of Robert Sklar, passed the game along to one of 
his mentees, Daniel Okrent.50 
Nearly fifteen years later, in November of 1979, Daniel 
Okrent gathered a group of his friends at a New York City 
bistro, called “La Rotisserie Francaise,” to pitch to them the 
idea of a fantasy baseball league.51 It was this meeting, and 
more specifically its location, that inspired the term 
“rotisserie baseball league,” which is still the term used 
today to describe the most common format of season-long 
fantasy baseball.52 In 1980, Okrent, Sklar, and nine of their 
professional comrades held the inaugural auction draft for 
 
 46. Id. at 5–6. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 6. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6–7. 
 52. See id. at 7. 
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their Rotisserie League.53 Each participant posted a $260 
entry fee and used this money to bid on players in an auction 
draft format.54 As per the original rules, these eleven 
competitors could only select players from National League 
rosters, and the winner was determined at the end of the 
Major League Baseball Season, based on the statistical 
performances of their respective rosters of players in eight 
designated categories.55 The winner, whose roster earned the 
most collective points over the course of the season, would 
thereby win the pool of entry-fee cash and be ceremonially 
doused in the chocolate drink “Yoo-Hoo” for his or her 
efforts.56 These eleven fantasy trailblazers could not possibly 
have known that what had begun as an engaging 
recreational outlet, if not a bit of a joke amongst friends, 
would eventually grow into a multi-billion dollar industry in 
less than three decades.57 
Since several of the original members in the Rotisserie 
League were themselves media members, who in turn had 
many acquaintances in the national media, it did not take 
long for word to get out about this new activity.58 Before the 
inaugural 1980 season was even completed, The New York 
Times and the CBS Morning News had already run stories 
on the Rotisserie League, even going so far as to chronicle the 
biographies and individual performances of the eleven 
competitors.59 The game quickly developed a cult-like 
following,60 and new variations on the original rules were 
introduced soon thereafter, including head-to-head formats 
 
 53. Id.; see also Josh Robbins, Geek Games: It’s Been 25 Years Since 11 Fans 
Held First Rotisserie Auction, ORL. SENTINEL, Jun. 8, 2005, at D1. 
 54. Edelman, supra note 42, at 7. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 7–8. 
 57. See id. at 8–11; see also Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 58. Edelman, supra note 42, at 8. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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of the game. A new moniker—“fantasy baseball”—was also 
widely adopted.61 Today, nearly forty years after the 
inaugural season, there are two primary versions of season-
long fantasy baseball offered through major providers like 
ESPN: head-to-head leagues and rotisserie leagues.62 
In due time, the basic concept of Rotisserie League 
Baseball was expanded into other “fantasy sports,” such as 
football and basketball.63 By the early 1990’s, fantasy sports 
started to gain steady traction as fantasy sports magazines, 
season guides, radio shows, statistical services, management 
groups, sportswear, and newsletters increasingly appeared 
on the scene.64 Despite the escalating popularity, fantasy 
sports were still viewed as primarily being “an activit[y] for 
outcasts and engaged [in] by those presumed to be overly 
bookish and socially challenged” at this point in time.65 Then, 
in 1994, the entire landscape of fantasy sports in America 
was forever changed with the advent of the Internet.66 
The Internet not only facilitated immense growth for the 
fantasy industry, but it also precipitated a rapid 
demographic shift amongst fantasy participants.67 Fantasy 
sports participation was no longer disproportionately 
appealing to the statistically-minded, as the Internet 
eliminated the need for individuals to tabulate statistics and 
calculate results for themselves.68 Additionally, participants 
were no longer in a position where their own participation 
 
 61. See id. at 8–9. 
 62. Scoring Formats, ESPN, http://games.espn.com/flb/resources/help/
content?name=scoring-formats (last visited Mar. 22, 2017) (showing different 
fantasy baseball scoring formats). 
 63. See Edelman, supra note 42, at 9 (stating that the core rules of the original 
fantasy baseball games were later adopted and applied to fantasy games in other 
sports). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 10. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See id. 
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depended on the respective interests of their close friends 
and relatives. The Internet quite literally opened the door to 
a whole world of potential fantasy competitors, regardless of 
geographical proximity or prior relationships.69 Companies 
such as ESPN quickly took advantage of the wealth of new 
possibilities, and by 1995, it introduced its first Internet-
based fantasy game.70 By 2000, ESPN offered fantasy 
contests in a wide range of sports beyond baseball including 
football, basketball, hockey, NASCAR, soccer, golf, and fly 
fishing.71 As of 2009, season-long fantasy sports was already 
a five-billion-dollar industry.72 
B. Daily Fantasy Sports Enter the Market 
On October 13, 2006, President George W. Bush 
inadvertently and indirectly launched the daily fantasy 
sports industry when he signed the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) into law.73 The law was 
aimed at eradicating illegal online poker and sports betting 
operations, and it was groundbreaking in the sense that it 
was the first time that Internet payment processors would 
be held liable for their role in facilitating illegal online 
gambling.74 The logic was simple: if online gambling 
operations could not collect user fees, then their services 
could effectively be rendered obsolete. To this end, the law 
was largely successful, as many of the more prominent 
sportsbooks and online poker outfits voluntarily left the U.S. 
marketplace, which consequently made the task of isolating 
and prosecuting the remaining illegal gambling operations 
 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 10–11. 
 72. See id. at 11. 
 73. See Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: 
A Detailed Primer in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 
122–23 (2016); Van Natta, supra note 1. 
 74. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 122–23. 
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for their many violations of federal and state law a much 
simpler task.75 
There were other unintended consequences stemming 
from the passage of UIGEA, however. For instance, when all 
of the online sportsbooks and poker enterprises suddenly left 
the U.S. market, they left behind a void, as consumer 
demand for such products did not exit the market.76 This was 
likely not surprising to lawmakers; yet, what they could not 
possibly have realized at the time was that UIGEA, the very 
law that had driven illegal online gambling from the United 
States and thereby created this void, had also 
simultaneously provided the legal gray area that ultimately 
inspired and facilitated the reincarnation of online sports 
gambling in its newest form: daily fantasy sports.77 For, at 
the behest of the fantasy sports industry, and the 
professional sports leagues themselves, a carve-out was 
made in UIGEA to allow for the incredibly popular season-
long fantasy sports leagues to continue to legally operate in 
the United States.78 The law was completely silent on daily 
fantasy sports, as they had not yet been invented at this 
time. In fact, as will be discussed at length infra, it was this 
very same legal carve-out that would eventually provide a 
“safe harbor” for the leading daily fantasy sports enterprises 
to gain an initial foothold, and to subsequently grow their 
operations exponentially over the course of several years.79 
Daily fantasy operations, as we know them today, are 
relatively standard in their formats, particularly amongst 
the two industry giants, FanDuel and DraftKings. On both 
sites, users are provided with a “salary cap,” which is 
effectively their budget for selecting players, and then tasked 
with the challenge of constructing a lineup of real-life 
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players—each having previously been assigned a “salary” by 
the respective site—under the limitations of the 
aforementioned salary cap.80 Players can then pay entry fees 
ranging from a single dollar all the way up to $10,600 in 
order to enter these lineups into a variety of different 
contests, including one-on-one matchups, fifty-fifty contests 
(where the top-scoring fifty percent of players win cash 
prizes), and tournaments featuring hundreds of thousands of 
competitors and cash prizes that oftentimes reach seven 
figure dollar amounts.81 However, the first companies 
branding themselves as “daily fantasy sports” operations 
that entered the market in the wake of UIGEA really did not 
resemble daily fantasy sports as we know them today.82 
These companies, such as Fantasy Day Sports Corp., were 
primarily just sportsbooks couching themselves as fantasy 
games.83 Yet, as Fantasy Day Sports Corp. and similar 
entities inexplicably got away with their continued 
operation, other variations began to pop up, some of which 
more closely resembled the products that the legions of daily 
fantasy participants are accustomed to today.84 Beginning in 
2008, companies such as Snapdraft, Fantasy Factor, 
Fantazzle, FanDuel, DraftStreet, DraftDay, and DraftKings 
appeared on the daily fantasy scene.85 But, eventually, 
FanDuel and DraftKings emerged to establish their market 
dominance. 
FanDuel originated in Edinburgh, Scotland, in 2008, as 
“HubDub,” a web-based prediction market site that allowed 
users to bet virtual money on the outcome of significant 
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events, such as the 2008 U.S. presidential election.86 
According to Nigel Eccles, the founder and CEO of FanDuel, 
HubDub actually proved to be very popular and engaging. 
However, it had one major flaw—it was not conducive to 
generating revenue in its original format.87 Recognizing that 
sports was one of the most popular categories on HubDub, 
and realizing the need to incorporate real money into the 
existing business model, Eccles looked across the Atlantic at 
the booming fantasy sports industry in the United States and 
saw room for improvement.88 Specifically, Eccles believed 
that there were two significant deficiencies in the existing 
season-long renditions of fantasy sports in America: they 
were not particularly mobile-friendly in an era where people 
increasingly owned smartphones, and, perhaps most 
notably, they were not nearly fast-paced enough for a 
millennial generation that seemed to have an affinity for 
instant gratification.89 Additionally, it was evident to the 
founders of FanDuel, some of whom were veterans of the 
online poker industry, that the passage of UIGEA had left a 
void in the U.S. marketplace, and they were enticed by the 
untapped potential that existed for a fantasy sports product 
that bore many of the same characteristics of a traditional 
online gambling operation.90 Finally, after diligently 
reviewing the text of UIGEA, Eccles concluded that his newly 
conceived daily fantasy sports product would enjoy “safe 
harbor” under the new law, and FanDuel was launched.91 
As FanDuel began to grow, the three men who 
eventually founded DraftKings, Jason Robins, Matt Kalish, 
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and Paul Liberman, were all still working at the printing 
company, Vistaprint, near Boston, Massachusetts.92 In 
January 2011, Kalish first proposed to Robins the idea of 
taking the basic premise of season-long fantasy sports, and 
condensing it into a single day of action.93 Mere days later, 
undeterred by the discovery that FanDuel was already 
gaining a good amount of traction in the market, the three 
men set to work.94 By November 2011, the young CEO 
Robins was able to secure his first investor, Ryan Moore.95 
Although Moore invested one million dollars in the fledgling 
company, the three co-founders still struggled to gain more 
investors, and the capital that they desperately needed.96 
Finally, Moore challenged the young men to quit their jobs 
at Vistaprint and fully invest in the company themselves if 
they wanted to convince others to do the same. They did so 
and quickly attracted more investors.97 On April 27, 2012, 
DraftKings hosted its inaugural fantasy contest,98 and, 
within three short years, they were vying with FanDuel for 
industry supremacy.99 
C. The Legality of Daily Fantasy Sports in the United 
States 
From its inception, the legal position of daily fantasy 
sports in the United States has always been rather tenuous, 
at both the state and federal levels. This Section provides a 
look at the relevant federal laws as well as the three distinct 
state approaches to determining the legality of fantasy 
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sports. In considering these state and federal statutes, there 
are two important considerations to bear in mind. The first 
of these is quite simple: the definition of the word “gamble.” 
The two primary definitions provided for “gamble” in the 
Merriam-Webster dictionary are: “to play a game for money 
or property” and “to bet on an uncertain outcome.”100 The 
second important consideration to keep in mind is the basic 
business models of fantasy sports. Players pay “entry fees” to 
fantasy sports contests, which generally begin and end 
within a single day’s time, and the players who score the 
highest will win real money, based on how high they finish 
and the contest format.101 Meanwhile, similar to an online 
poker venture, the daily fantasy companies derive their 
profits from taking a percentage “rake” or “vig” from the total 
entry fees collected for a given contest.102 With these factual 
considerations in mind, it is time to juxtapose them with an 
examination of the existing legal framework at the time of 
the daily fantasy industry’s inception. 
1. Federal Laws Pertaining to Fantasy Sports 
There are four federal laws that are currently relevant 
to the legality of the daily fantasy sports industry: the 
Interstate Wire Act of 1964 (Wire Act), the Illegal Gambling 
Business Act of 1970 (Gambling Act), the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), and the 
aforementioned Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act (UIGEA).103 To date, no legal action has been taken 
against the daily fantasy sports industry on the basis of these 
federal laws; however, a closer examination of the text of 
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these laws demonstrates that companies like FanDuel and 
DraftKings are not exactly in a comfortable legal position at 
the federal level either.104 Significantly, these are federal 
laws, and thus individuals or entities that engage in illegal 
gambling, as defined by state or local laws, still may be 
subject to federal prosecution.105 
The first of these federal laws, the Wire Act, was passed 
in 1964 and prohibits individuals and entities from engaging 
in gambling activities through the knowing use of “a wire 
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or 
foreign commerce . . . .”106 The law was initially designed to 
inhibit the abilities of organized crime gambling rings by 
preventing criminals from obtaining the results of horse 
races via telegraph communications.107 Notably, Internet 
communications have subsequently been deemed within the 
scope of the Wire Act, in both state108 and federal courts.109 
Therefore, in light of these decisions, daily fantasy 
companies that function exclusively via the Internet, and 
continuously cross state lines in so doing, are most likely in 
constant violation of the Wire Act if they are in fact gambling 
operations. 
Similarly, under the federal Gambling Act, anyone who 
“conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all 
or part of an illegal gambling business” could face hefty fines 
and up to five years in prison.110 Any potential illegality will 
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again likely come down to the laws of a given state.111 The 
three primary approaches to defining what constitutes illegal 
gambling at the state level will be discussed, at length, infra. 
In 1992, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act was signed into law, largely at the behest of the four 
major professional sports leagues in the United States—the 
NFL, NBA, NHL, and MLB—in addition to the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).112 These leagues 
wanted to discourage both private and state-sponsored 
sports gambling in an effort to both reaffirm and maintain 
the integrity of their collective leagues and minimize the 
potential for unscrupulous or dishonest behavior to influence 
the outcome of sporting events.113 In relevant part, PASPA 
prohibits any person or state from conducting “a lottery, 
sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme 
based, directly or indirectly . . . on one or more competitive 
games in which amateur or professional athletes 
participate . . . .”114 Importantly, this law also grants 
automatic standing for any of these five athletic leagues to 
directly bring suit against any person or entity deemed to be 
in violation of this law; in doing so, it also prohibits any state 
from legalizing certain forms of sports gambling.115 For this 
reason, only four states have any form of legalized sports 
betting today: Delaware, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon.116 
All four of these states had already legalized sports betting 
at the time PASPA was signed into law, and even they had 
to vigorously fight to be grandfathered in under the new 
law.117 
 
 111. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 138. 
 112. See id. at 139–40. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 
(2012); id. 
 115. See Edelman, supra note 73, at 140. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
2018] FANTASY SPORTS 737 
Therefore, the legality of daily fantasy sports at the 
federal level, at least with respect to PASPA, is primarily 
dependent on the whims of the professional sports leagues 
and their management and ownership, since the leagues 
hold much of the prosecutorial power.118 As such, it is no 
surprise that both FanDuel and DraftKings have actively 
sought, and received, the endorsements of several of these 
professional sports leagues, including a couple of high-profile 
NFL franchise owners, such as Jerry Jones and Robert 
Kraft.119 With this in mind, FanDuel and DraftKings do not 
appear to be in any immediate jeopardy under PASPA, since 
it would be counterintuitive for the major professional 
leagues and owners to simultaneously invest in, and bring 
suit against, these daily fantasy sports enterprises. 
The fourth pertinent federal law, and the one that 
FanDuel and DraftKings ostensibly tailored their respective 
business models to exude a perceived conformity with, is the 
aforementioned Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement 
Act of 2006. While UIGEA has been largely successful in 
eradicating online poker operations and sportsbooks, it 
contains a carve-out for season-long fantasy sports, and it 
was this carve-out that would become critically important to 
Nigel Eccles and Jason Robins as they launched their 
fledgling daily fantasy sports enterprises.120 This carve-out 
provides safe harbor to “any fantasy or simulation sports 
game . . . or contest,” as long as three additional criteria are 
met: (1) any prizes and awards offered must be established 
prior to the commencement of the contest and cannot be 
solely dependent on the number of competitors or the total 
amount of fees paid by competitors; (2) the outcome of the 
contests must be reflective of the relative knowledge and 
skill of the competitors and must be based predominantly on 
the statistical performances of real-life athletes in multiple 
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real-world sporting events; and (3) no winning outcome can 
be based solely on the performance of any single real-world 
team or the performance of a single real-world athlete in any 
event.121 
It was primarily this set of criteria that encouraged 
Eccles to design FanDuel so that the site (1) offers pre-
determined prizes and guaranteed prize pools, (2) most often 
rewards the most skilled and experienced participants, and 
(3) limits the number of players from a single real-world 
team that a participant can utilize in a given FanDuel 
lineup.122 DraftKings subscribes to largely the same business 
model, however it has been known to push the legal envelope 
by offering contests in individual sports such as golf and 
NASCAR, which raises the question as to whether it violated 
UIGEA’s requirement that winning outcomes be based on 
multiple real-world events.123 
2. State Approaches to Fantasy Sports Legality 
As discussed above, state laws have a significant bearing 
on fantasy sports legality, not only in each individual state, 
but also on the federal legal status of daily fantasy sports. 
With that in mind, it is important to understand the three 
distinct state level approaches to analyzing whether or not 
daily fantasy sports constitutes illegal gambling in a given 
state. 
Generally speaking, a prima facie claim of illegal 
gambling can only be established at the state level when 
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three elements are present: consideration, reward, and 
chance.124 Since daily fantasy sports contests indisputably 
meet the elements of consideration and reward, the legal 
question primarily centers on the element of chance.125 This 
is the reason that FanDuel and DraftKings have historically 
gone to great lengths to brand their products as “games of 
skill,” for a game based on “skill” is legal, whereas a game 
based on “chance” may or may not be, depending on a state’s 
individual approach.126 The requisite skill-to-chance ratio, 
which is so pivotal in determining the legality of this entire 
industry, varies between states; however, there are three 
primary approaches to this centrally important issue.127 
These three approaches are: the “predominant purpose test,” 
the “material element test,” and the “modicum of chance” 
standard.128 
The majority approach amongst states is to employ the 
“predominant purpose test,” which is an analysis of whether 
a contest involves more skill than chance.129 Put simply, if 
the contest is deemed to be based more on skill (or 
knowledge), than it is on chance, then the contest is legal in 
a state employing the predominant purpose test. Conversely, 
if the game were determined to be predominantly chance-
based, then the contest would be considered illegal gambling 
(having also satisfied the consideration and reward 
elements). Daily fantasy sports certainly involve notable 
elements of chance, including both “imperfect information” 
chance (manifesting itself in the unpredictability of player 
injuries, weather conditions, game cancellations, etc.) and 
“lucky shot” chance (which occurs when a relatively 
inexperienced and less knowledgeable player simply gets 
 
 124. Edelman, supra note 73, at 30. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 130–35. 
 128. See id. 
 129. Id. at 130. 
740 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
lucky and selects players that perform unexpectedly well).130 
On the other hand, since player performance can be largely 
dependent on more predictable analytical considerations, 
such as past statistical performance, team matchups, and 
past player usage rates, there is a degree of knowledge and 
skill that can be somewhat determinative in daily fantasy 
contests. Some courts have ostensibly acknowledged the 
presence of skill in fantasy games, too.131 Therefore, it is 
largely unclear how a given state court will interpret daily 
fantasy sports under the predominant purpose test, but the 
analysis would certainly have to be a fact intensive exercise, 
as some scholars have noted.132 
A stricter approach to the question of daily fantasy 
sports legality, taken in a minority of states, involves 
analyzing whether or not chance is a “material element” in a 
given contest.133 This “material element test,” employed in 
states like Missouri and New York, does not require that 
chance be the dominant or majority determinant in a contest; 
it merely requires a “material” degree of significance, with 
respect to determining the outcome of such contests.134 It is 
therefore possible for skill to be the predominant factor in a 
contest, yet still have that contest deemed illegal under the 
material element test.135 
The third state approach in determining what 
constitutes a game of chance is the “modicum of chance” 
standard.136 This standard, used by states like Arizona, 
Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, and Tennessee, outlaws games 
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that feature “even a modicum of chance.”137 Therefore, in the 
absence of specific legislation to the contrary, daily fantasy 
sports are patently illegal in all of these states, since it is 
incontrovertible that daily fantasy involves at least some 
degree of chance. 
Finally, there are two outlier states, Hawaii and 
Montana, that take distinctly unique approaches.138 
Montana has a blanket prohibition on all forms of 
commercial online gambling, thereby maintaining a 
monopoly on gambling within the state,139 whereas Hawaii 
prohibits contests that “encourage a gambling instinct.”140 
FanDuel and DraftKings recognized the problematic climate 
in Montana from the outset of their enterprises, and 
subsequently never operated within the state; furthermore, 
the leading daily fantasy providers both ceased operations in 
Hawaii, following an unfavorable opinion issued by the state 
Attorney General, Doug Chin, which concluded that daily 
fantasy sports did in fact constitute illegal gambling under 
state law.141 
II. STATE RESPONSES TO THE DAILY FANTASY SPORTS 
INDUSTRY 
For a number of years, the daily fantasy industry was 
able to operate relatively inconspicuously; however, that 
began to change as FanDuel and DraftKings grew and 
garnered increasing national attention. Some of this 
attention was negative, and much of it can be directly 
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attributed to lapses in judgment on the part of management 
at the two companies, the increased confidence that 
oftentimes accompanies success, and perhaps even a false 
sense of legal security.142 Irrespective of the exact causes, the 
resulting consequences are undisputed: one by one, states 
began to challenge the legality of daily fantasy sports, and 
they did so in a very public and damaging way.143 
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman led this 
charge, and although New York’s prohibition on daily 
fantasy sports was relatively short-lived, Schneiderman set 
the template for challenging the legality of daily fantasy 
sports, and thereby paved the way for other states to do the 
same.144 But New York was also instrumental in establishing 
another important precedent pertaining to daily fantasy 
sports: by passing legislation that both legalized and 
regulated daily fantasy contests in New York, the state 
effectively saved the daily fantasy sports industry, while 
introducing much-needed consumer safeguards.145 These 
initial hard-won legislative affirmations afforded the daily 
fantasy leaders an opportunity to recover, and while they 
still face a multitude of legal hurdles in states across the 
country, there is a growing momentum for states to legalize 
and regulate the activity. 
A. How the Daily Fantasy Sports Industry Attracted 
Increased Scrutiny 
As of 2013, having already experienced rampant growth, 
FanDuel and DraftKings were poised to take their 
operations to another level altogether. On December 8, 2013, 
FanDuel crowned the first-ever one-day fantasy sports 
millionaire, a sales manager from Sioux City, Iowa, named 
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Travis Spieth.146 Spieth had turned a mere ten dollars into 
one million dollars in the FanDuel Fantasy Football 
Championship.147 A year later, Scott Hansen, a personal 
trainer from Pasadena, California, became the first one-day 
multi-millionaire, having taken home two million dollars in 
the very same contest.148 The fact that the first place prize 
money had quite literally doubled in a year’s time can be 
accurately viewed as a microcosm of the growth experienced 
in the industry as a whole. In 2011, daily fantasy entry fees 
totaled $20 million; by 2014, annual entry fees had hit $1 
billion.149 
By the end of 2014, DraftKings had clearly established 
itself as FanDuel’s prime competitor, a move that was 
solidified when DraftKings purchased the third-largest daily 
fantasy site, DraftStreet, earlier that summer.150 
Meanwhile, perhaps motivated by concerns stemming from 
their precarious legal positions under PASPA, the two 
companies moved quickly to solidify the approval of the 
professional sports leagues. After all, in March 2013, the 
chief executive of Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 
Robert Bowman, publicly stated that he viewed daily fantasy 
sports contests as “akin to a flip of the coin, which is the 
definition of gambling.”151 Yet, by the end of 2014, Major 
League Baseball and the National Hockey League had 
advertising partnerships and investments with DraftKings, 
whereas the National Basketball Association had 
established an exclusive partnership, in exchange for an 
equity stake, with FanDuel.152 These leagues were largely 
enamored with the role the daily fantasy sites were playing 
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in boosting their respective television ratings.153 
As all of this growth was occurring, the Fantasy Sports 
Trade Association’s president, Paul Charchian, strongly 
urged the two industry leaders to tread lightly.154 At a 
meeting in January 2013, he advised the companies to 
deemphasize the monetary aspects of their contests, remove 
all gambling-related language from their websites, and 
refrain from marketing the notion that daily fantasy 
participants could potentially win big money.155 In fact, Nigel 
Eccles echoed this sentiment himself in an April 2014 better-
business consumer protection charter that he drafted.156 But, 
ultimately, the two companies simply could not resist. 
The Fantasy Sports Trade Association had also strongly 
recommended that the companies proactively campaign in 
states and work with lawmakers to establish the legality of 
their enterprises.157 The establishment of a self-regulatory 
board, which would monitor customer complaints and 
maintain the integrity and transparency of daily fantasy 
contests, was also suggested.158 However, both of the 
aforementioned recommendations were mostly dismissed by 
the companies, as they deemed them to be unnecessary and 
expensive endeavors.159 
The calls for a regulatory board were largely in response 
to complaints from everyday players who cited predatory 
tactics by the big-money, high-volume players colloquially 
referred to as “sharks.”160 Approximately fifty of these high-
volume sharks wager at least $1 million each year on 
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FanDuel and DraftKings; they have been known to enter 
upwards of one hundred lineups in a single, big-money 
contest.161 Aside from sheer volume, another frequent tactic 
of sharks is to use a computerized script (oftentimes 
undetectable to the sites) to target inexperienced players in 
the site’s “lobbies,” as the scripts enable them to 
instantaneously crunch performance data and seek out 
competitors that give them a better chance of victory.162 
Other scripts have been employed to enable participants to 
make last-second changes to multiple lineups at once.163 The 
sites always policed this behavior, sometimes even 
suspending players, but they never did so with the 
regulatory teeth or vigor that they could have.164 After all, 
sixty percent of all revenue in the daily fantasy industry was 
estimated to come from the roughly 15,000 high-volume 
players who wagered at least $10,000 annually.165 Yet, this 
should have been immensely alarming to FanDuel and 
DraftKings because it threatened the very foundation of 
their industry’s legality: the idea that daily fantasy sports 
were in fact “games of skill.” As one former FanDuel 
consultant, John Sullivan, put it: “It’s only a skill game if you 
have the biggest bankroll and the best technology . . . [t]hat’s 
the dirty little secret.”166 
Instead, entering the 2015 NFL season, the two industry 
leaders primarily focused on their escalating marketing 
arms race, as they vied for a larger portion of the fifty-seven 
million Americans who played fantasy sports, attempting to 
lure them away from the season-long format with the 
enticing selling points of fast-paced action, thrilling 
competition, instant gratification, and, most prominently, 
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immensely lucrative paydays.167 Having just consummated 
funding rounds of $275 million and $300 million, 
respectively, FanDuel and DraftKings prepared to levy a 
marketing onslaught.168 
Following the 2014 NFL season, in which FanDuel spent 
more money on advertising than DraftKings did, DraftKings 
pledged to never be outspent by their rival again, and they 
delivered on this promise.169 During the first week of 
September 2015, DraftKings actually spent more money on 
advertising than any other U.S. company, with an incredible 
$24,067,328 spent on 6,749 national commercial airings, over 
the course of seven days.170 To put this in perspective, in the 
weeks leading up to the 2015 NFL season, the two companies 
spent more on advertising than the entire U.S. beer industry 
combined.171 By year’s end, the two companies had sunk 
$750 million into advertising; at one point, a FanDuel or 
DraftKings commercial was appearing onscreen every ninety 
seconds, on average.172 FanDuel had initially planned to 
scale-back its advertising expenditures in 2015, likely 
sensing that it might be a good time to keep a lower profile; 
however, after DraftKings surpassed them over the summer 
by establishing sixty percent of the market share, FanDuel 
reversed course and tried to keep pace with DraftKings.173 
As if the exorbitant television spending was not already 
sufficient, the two companies also struck deals for 
advertising and signage with entities like the Walt Disney 
Corporation (the parent company of both ABC and ESPN) 
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and in professional sports stadiums and arenas, across the 
country.174 By September 2015, the Wall Street Journal 
estimated FanDuel and DraftKings to be worth $1.3 billion 
and $1.2 billion, respectively.175 
Then, on October 5, 2015, scandal struck when The New 
York Times broke the story of Ethan Haskell, a DraftKings 
employee who had allegedly used inside information to win 
$350,000 in a FanDuel NFL contest.176 As soon as the story 
came off the press, irreversible damage was done, as Haskell 
had apparently utilized protected player usage data—a 
statistic that would likely remain relatively consistent 
between the two sites—in order to choose his winning lineup 
on FanDuel.177 Part of what makes succeeding in daily 
fantasy sports challenging is the fact that it is not enough to 
merely select the best players, because the salary cap largely 
prevents this, and even if it did not, it is intuitively not 
beneficial to only select players that the majority of other 
competitors have also selected. Therefore, it is strategically 
vital to pick a few cheaper, less-utilized players, whom most 
other people have not selected, because if and when those 
players have good statistical outputs, a participant has 
thereby gained a large advantage over the rest of the field. 
Therefore, the accusations against Haskell were gravely 
concerning to the daily fantasy industry leaders, both of 
whom already forbade their employees from playing on their 
employers’ sites, and discouraged high-profile participation 
on their competitors’ sites, because it was the kind of incident 
that would attract intense regulatory and legal scrutiny; 
and, the very next day, it did.178 
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B. New York State’s Response 
The morning after The New York Times story broke, New 
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman called a two-hour 
meeting to analyze the situation and consider the State’s 
legal response.179 While The New York Times article was the 
impetus for the meeting, the topic of conversation quickly 
turned to the barrage of advertisements, which promised 
instant wealth.180 As Kathleen McGee, Chief of the Bureau 
of Internet & Technology of the New York Attorney General’s 
Office put it, “Their ads are everywhere . . . You couldn’t 
escape them.”181 
Word of Schneiderman’s investigation soon leaked, and 
by October 6, 2015, companies like ESPN began removing 
the companies’ advertising elements from their 
broadcasts.182 Less than two weeks later, on October 16, 
Nevada became the first state to prohibit FanDuel and 
DraftKings from continuing to operate within the state.183 
This move, however, was primarily motivated by Nevada’s 
desire to protect its domestic gaming industry; in fact, daily 
fantasy sports are patently legal in Nevada, provided that 
operators first obtain a license, which neither FanDuel nor 
DraftKings bothered to do.184 Finally, on November 10, 
Schneiderman sent individual letters to FanDuel and 
DraftKings, ordering both companies to cease and desist 
operations in New York.185 This was a huge blow to the two 
companies, particularly so for FanDuel, which was 
headquartered in New York City, and had also recently 
struck marketing deals with two of the NFL franchises 
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affiliated with the State, in the Buffalo Bills and the New 
York Jets.186 In a powerful press release that day, 
Schneiderman stated: “It is clear that DraftKings and 
FanDuel are the leaders of a massive, multibillion-dollar 
scheme intended to evade the law and fleece sports fans 
across the country. Today we have sent a clear message: not 
in New York, and not on my watch.”187 
One week later, Schneiderman filed a scathing 
memorandum of law in support of the preliminary injunction 
he was seeking against the two companies.188 In this 
memorandum, Schneiderman began by applying the 
relevant New York standard: the “material element test.”189 
In proffering his conclusion that daily fantasy did in fact 
depend significantly on chance, he cited the fact that such 
random occurrences as player injuries, bad bounces, and 
weather events could “irrevocably alter the outcome of a 
[daily fantasy contest].”190 But Schneiderman was only 
getting warmed up. 
New York’s Attorney General then took the two industry 
leaders to task for providing a “plainly illegal” product that 
was “nothing more than a rebranding of sports betting.”191 
He then targeted the companies’ excessive advertising 
campaigns for misleading people into truly believing that the 
fantasy contests were merely “games of skill,” in saying “no 
bettor—no matter how shrewd or sophisticated—can control 
or influence whether . . . athletes will succeed.”192 Notably, 
Schneiderman also seemed to take issue with the very 
practice that the Fantasy Sports Trade Association, and 
Nigel Eccles, had cautioned the fledgling industry against, in 
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observing that the companies’ “unrelenting barrage of 
advertisements that depict FanDuel and DraftKings as a 
new form of lottery,” and that the companies lured 
unsuspecting people into predatory gambling operations 
through their advertised depictions of “cash falling from the 
ceiling,” “oversized novelty checks,” and promises of “life-
changing piles of cash.”193 
However, in New York, the prohibition was relatively 
short-lived; on August 3, 2016, New York Governor Andrew 
Cuomo signed “An Act to Amend the Racing, Pari-Mutuel 
Wagering and Breeding Law, in Relation to the Registration 
and Regulation of Interactive Fantasy Sports Contests” into 
law, thereby declaring daily fantasy contests legal “games of 
skill.”194 
Importantly, the legislation contained several key 
regulatory elements, as well as financial incentives for other 
states to take similar legislative action, with respect to the 
daily fantasy industry. First and foremost, the new law 
requires operators to register with the state once every three 
years, and in so doing, enhances transparency by requiring 
that registered operators agree to periodic audits of their 
books and records.195 Additionally, a series of procedural 
safeguards were introduced, including: limiting players to 
one active account with a site, prohibiting participants under 
the age of eighteen, requiring that advertisements accurately 
represent the odds of winning, limiting a player’s allotted 
number of entries into a given contest, and introducing 
information and assistance for compulsive gambling.196 
Moreover, the law features revenue-generating aspects, 
including a fifteen percent tax on gross revenue, along with 
an additional secondary tax that is not to exceed $50,000 per 
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year.197 The tax is estimated to generate at least $4 million 
in annual state revenue,198 all of which is slated to go directly 
toward education funding.199 
Somewhat surprisingly, Schneiderman reversed course, 
and defended the new law asserting the legality of daily 
fantasy sports.200 This complete change of opinion garnered 
negative attention from anti-gambling organizations,201 but 
Schneiderman was not ready to completely absolve the 
industry he had previously staunchly opposed, as he opted to 
maintain his false advertising suit against FanDuel and 
DraftKings, a suit that has subsequently been settled, with 
both companies agreeing to pay $6 million in damages.202 
C. Other States Follow New York’s Lead 
In the wake of the prohibitions in New York and Nevada, 
seven other states followed suit,203 and several of these 
states’ attorneys generals even went so far as to directly cite 
New York’s actions in the matter.204 Within months, 
Alabama, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, Tennessee, 
and Texas similarly forced FanDuel and DraftKings to cease 
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and desist operations in their states.205 Other states, such as 
Illinois, have issued negative opinions on the legality of daily 
fantasy sports, but have nonetheless permitted operations to 
continue.206 In that sense, it is fair to credit Schneiderman, 
and New York, with setting a precedent for examining the 
legality of daily fantasy, and also, perhaps more importantly, 
for providing the impetus for the daily fantasy industry to 
actively seek legal clarification and initiate dialogue with 
legislators, in states across the country. 
In March 2016, Virginia became the first state to 
unequivocally assert the legality of daily fantasy sports, 
while simultaneously regulating the industry, when 
Governor Terry McCauliffe signed “The Fantasy Contests 
Act” into law.207 Within four months, five additional states—
Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, and 
Tennessee—introduced legislation of their own, thereby 
declaring daily fantasy sports legal, and subjecting them to 
state regulation.208 Interestingly, the majority of these states 
all seemed to recognize the value in daily fantasy as a means 
to generate revenue within their respective states.209 To 
date, state legislatures have expressly legalized daily 
fantasy sports in seventeen states, with Arkansas, Delaware, 
Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Vermont also joining the 
ranks.210 
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While sports law experts disagree over how expeditiously 
it will occur,211 it is difficult to deny the growing momentum 
for legalizing, regulating, and taxing daily fantasy sports in 
states around the country. As of the time of this writing, 
there are twelve additional states where legislation to 
legalize daily fantasy is pending: Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, Nebraska, Washington, and Wisconsin.212 
Particularly noteworthy among these, are a pair of “modicum 
of chance” states, Iowa and Washington, as well as Hawaii, 
a state where gambling has traditionally been prohibited. On 
the other hand, the introduction of legislation is only the first 
step in the process, so the daily fantasy industry is not yet in 
a comfortable position. In states like Alabama, Arizona, 
California, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas, and West Virginia, legislative efforts have been 
introduced, but ultimately were stopped short of being 
signed into law.213 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DAILY FANTASY SPORTS 
CONTROVERSY ON SPORTS BETTING POLICIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
The brief, yet rather tumultuous, history of the daily 
fantasy sports industry’s early years, complete with the legal 
challenges advanced in states like New York, the ultimate 
legislative successes in several of these states, and the 
growing momentum for similar legal validation in additional 
states, is likely illustrative of both the present status, and 
future direction, of sports gambling policy in the United 
States. The trials and tribulations of the daily fantasy sports 
industry, and its hard-earned triumphs in several states, 
are, in all likelihood, a microcosm for the imminent 
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liberalization of sports betting in America. At the present 
time, the State of New Jersey is actively challenging the 
constitutionality of the aforementioned Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.214 PASPA is the piece of legislation 
responsible for twice stymieing the New Jersey legislature’s 
attempts to legalize and regulate sports betting, within the 
State.215 A legislative and judicial victory for New Jersey in 
this matter would represent a monumental step in the right 
direction, as it would enable states to tap into immense 
revenue potential, render the sports betting black market 
obsolete and inutile, impose regulations on gambling 
activities that have gone largely unchecked, and introduce 
new consumer protection mechanisms. 
A. New Jersey’s Ongoing Fight Against PASPA 
When Congress initially enacted PASPA in 1992, it 
effectively banned sports betting in every state, with the 
exceptions of Nevada, Delaware, Oregon, and Montana, 
which had all previously adopted various forms of legal, 
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state-sanctioned sports betting or lotteries.216 Additionally, 
PASPA provided New Jersey with a special one-year window, 
during which time the state could enact its own sports 
betting regime; however, the New Jersey legislature was 
unable to pass any such authorization for state-sponsored 
sports betting within that permissible time period prior to 
PASPA taking effect.217 Nineteen years later, in 2011, New 
Jersey publicly reopened their considerations of a state-
sponsored sports betting program by holding a referendum 
on the issue, asking voters whether the state constitution 
should be amended to allow for legalized gambling on 
sporting events.218 Voters overwhelmingly voiced their 
support for legalized sports betting in New Jersey: sixty-four 
percent of voters supported the constitutional amendment, 
and the state legislature subsequently moved forward by 
enacting the Sports Wagering Act in 2012.219 
The Sports Wagering Act legalized and regulated sports 
betting, but restricted such activity to a limited number of 
designated casinos and racetracks throughout the state.220 
However, the Act was short-lived, as the NCAA, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, and MLB filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate the New 
Jersey law as a violation of PASPA.221 For its part, the State 
of New Jersey, led by Governor Chris Christie, admitted that 
the law was a facial violation of PASPA, but argued that 
PASPA itself was unconstitutional under the Tenth 
Amendment—the law sought to utilize the several states, 
and their respective legislatures, as vehicles to implement 
and enforce federal gambling policy interests.222 This, 
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Christie argued, contravened the fundamental principles of 
federalism, and more specifically the “anti-commandeering 
doctrine,” which prevents the federal government from 
simply dictating state law.223 Furthermore, this is 
particularly true in cases, such as this one, where Congress 
itself arguably had the authority to pass a federal gambling 
regulatory and enforcement scheme pursuant to the 
Commerce Clause, which likely would have lawfully 
preempted any contrary state legislative actions thereafter, 
but elected not to do so and to instead rely on the states to 
implement and carry out a federal policy initiative.224 
Ultimately, both the district court and the Third Circuit 
ruled in favor of the leagues, in what became known as the 
Christie I cases, and upheld the constitutionality of PASPA, 
stating that New Jersey could not affirmatively authorize 
sports betting, and thereby disregard the terms of PASPA; 
however, the Third Circuit indicated that the federal law 
would not prohibit a potential repeal of existing state 
gambling prohibitions.225 Due to the fact that PASPA, a 
federal law, was structured so as to rely on the maintenance 
and enforcement of state laws prohibiting gambling, a repeal 
of the state sports betting ban would effectively render 
PASPA obsolete within the state. 
In accordance with the Third Circuit’s holding in Christie 
I, New Jersey changed course and tried a different approach 
in 2014, when the state legislature passed Senate Bill 
2460.226 This new law did not affirmatively authorize sports 
betting anywhere in the state; instead, Senate Bill 2460 
partially repealed existing state bans on sports betting at 
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casinos and racetracks throughout the state, for individuals 
who are at least twenty-one-years-old.227 However, the 
NCAA and four major professional sports leagues again filed 
suit, and the district court once more struck down the state 
law, this time holding that the state had two options: either 
keep their existing state prohibitions on sports gambling 
entirely in place, or completely repeal them.228 On appeal, 
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s overall holding; 
but that is where New Jersey’s luck ostensibly began to 
change, because, unlike Christie I, this time the Third 
Circuit agreed to re-hear the case en banc.229 Yet, once again, 
the Third Circuit affirmed the ruling in favor of the sports 
leagues, essentially stating PASPA was not unconstitutional 
commandeering of state legislative authority, and that the 
2014 law was a violation of PASPA because it acted as an 
affirmative authorization to gamble at specific locations and 
on specific sports, even if it was artfully couched as a 
repeal.230 
Perhaps sensing inherent danger in striking down this 
partial repeal attempt on the basis that it was actually an 
affirmative authorization, particularly in light of its holding 
in Christie I, the Court of Appeals then attempted to distance 
itself somewhat from that prior decision, which, at the time, 
attempted to draw a formal distinction between affirmative 
authorizations and repeals.231 Nonetheless, Circuit Judge 
Julio Fuentes wrote a passionate dissent centering on this 
very jurisprudential inconsistency, opining that the 2014 
repeal contained “no explicit grant of permission” and that 
the law simply acted as “a self-executing deregulatory 
measure,” and furthermore, that the majority inferred an 
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authorization where one did not exist.232 Additionally, Judge 
Fuentes lamented the fact that the majority opinion “[failed] 
to explain why a partial repeal is equivalent to a [legal] grant 
of permission to engage in sports betting,” which would prove 
to be a critical point in the case moving forward.233 The 
danger in viewing a partial repeal of existing state law as an 
affirmative authorization is that it implies that only a total 
repeal of all state gambling laws will suffice under the 
requirements of PASPA, and, in fact, this is exactly what the 
District Court held in Christie II, likely based on the 
distinction between affirmative authorizations and repeals 
that the Court of Appeals had previously drawn in Christie 
I. However, if this interpretation of PASPA is accurate, and 
a partial repeal does amount to an affirmative authorization, 
then it puts states in a terrible position where their 
proverbial hands are essentially tied to their existing 
gambling prohibitions, unless they were to completely 
deregulate all sports gambling within their states, thereby 
necessarily allowing gambling on all sports, at all locations, 
by people of all ages, and without any ability for the state to 
license, regulate, introduce consumer protection 
mechanisms, or generate revenue from the activity. 
Following their latest Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
loss, the State of New Jersey once again petitioned the 
Supreme Court of the United States for certiorari, which 
seemed extremely unlikely, after the state had previously 
been denied certiorari in Christie I.234 Furthermore, after the 
Supreme Court requested an opinion from the U.S. Solicitor 
General as to whether or not the Court should hear the case, 
and the Solicitor General recommended that the Court not 
take up New Jersey’s appeal, it finally seemed like the end 
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of the line for sports betting in New Jersey.235 Yet, in a rather 
stunning turn of events, the Supreme Court granted New 
Jersey’s petition for certiorari, meaning that at least four 
Supreme Court Justices felt that the case was worth 
hearing.236 
Although the rationale for the Supreme Court Justices’ 
collective change of heart with respect to its interest in the 
constitutionality of PASPA remains unknown, it is entirely 
possible that the State of West Virginia factored heavily into 
their decision. At the time of the certiorari petition, West 
Virginia, which submitted an amicus brief in support of New 
Jersey’s position, had pending legislation that would have 
legalized sports betting within the state, irrespective of 
PASPA’s ongoing existence.237 Furthermore, when the 
inevitable legal challenge from the sports leagues came in 
opposition to West Virginia’s law, that case would have gone 
through the more conservative, federalist-minded Fourth 
Circuit.238 Therefore, it is quite conceivable that the Supreme 
Court would have been confronted with deciding the 
constitutionality of PASPA in the face of a looming circuit 
split, within a matter of a few years anyway. 
B. The Supreme Court Considers the Constitutionality of 
PASPA 
The central issue for the Supreme Court to decide in 
Murphy v. NCAA is whether PASPA violates the Tenth 
Amendment and the overarching principles of constitutional 
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federalism.239 In particular, the argument centers around 
the “anti-commandeering doctrine,” which stands for the 
idea that the federal government, acting through Congress, 
cannot compel states to implement federal legislative or 
policy initiatives, such as requiring states to prohibit 
gambling on sports, when Congress itself could have 
implemented such a prohibition.240 New Jersey argues that 
PASPA does in fact commandeer state legislatures, whereas 
the NCAA and professional sports leagues contend that 
PASPA is a wholly constitutional federal preemption of 
conflicting state law.241 
The origins of the anti-commandeering doctrine can be 
traced all the way back to the nineteenth century and, more 
specifically, the era of slavery in the United States.242 In 
response to the “Extradition Clause” and the “Fugitive Slave 
Clause” of the U.S. Constitution, in addition to the 1793 
“Fugitive Slave Act,” the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
passed a law prohibiting individuals from forcibly removing 
slaves from the commonwealth with the intention of 
returning them to slavery, in direct contravention of the 
aforementioned federal laws which generally provided for 
the return of escaped slaves to their owners.243 This conflict 
eventually led to the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, in which 
the Supreme Court struck down the Pennsylvania law on the 
basis of the Supremacy Clause, and held that the 
Pennsylvania law was preempted by the Fugitive Slave Act 
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and the Constitution.244 However, in the majority opinion, 
Justice Joseph Story wrote that, while the states could not 
interfere or prohibit people from returning escaped slaves in 
accordance with the Fugitive Slave Act, Congress could not 
force states to implement corresponding laws or to assist 
individuals or the federal government in carrying out the 
Fugitive Slave Act.245 In relevant part, Story stated: 
The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce [federal laws]; 
and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the 
power of interpretation, to insist, that the states are bound to 
provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national 
government, nowhere delegated or intrusted [sic] to them by the 
Constitution.246 
In other words, the federal Fugitive Slave Act was the 
exclusive province of the federal government to enforce, and 
it could not compel the states to participate in the execution 
of the law. 
The impact of Justice Story’s interpretations of 
federalism in Prigg would be lasting, even if seemingly 
dormant for a number of years thereafter. Additionally, 
although the ignominious holding in Prigg lands the case 
firmly in the Supreme Court “anti-canon” of cases, the 
parallel between Justice Story’s interpretation of dual 
sovereignty, and the modern “anti-commandeering” 
jurisprudence, is plainly apparent. Moreover, the rationales 
and constitutional interpretations behind some anti-canon 
holdings have seemingly stood the test of time, though the 
socially and morally repugnant institutions and ends that 
these interpretations were once employed to buoy, have 
fortunately long since died off.247 
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Following Prigg, the first modern appearance of the 
“anti-commandeering doctrine,” and the first time the court 
phrased it as “commandeering,” came over a century later, in 
the 1992 case of New York v. United States, in which a federal 
policy for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste was at 
issue.248 In striking down the federal act’s “take title 
provision,” the Court, in a decision authored by Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor, noted that “Congress may not simply 
‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal 
regulatory program.’”249 Furthermore, the opinion pointed 
out that “[w]hile Congress has substantial powers to govern 
the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to 
the States, the Constitution has never been understood to 
confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to 
govern according to Congress’ instructions.”250 Then, in the 
1997 case of Printz v. United States, a portion of the Brady 
Gun Bill was struck down because it required the states and 
local municipalities to administer a federal background 
check program.251 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin 
Scalia cited the Court’s earlier holding in New York, and 
observed that Congress 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address partic-
ular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer 
or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether 
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policymaking is involved . . . such commands are fundamentally in-
compatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.252 
Finally, in the 2012 case of National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, Chief Justice John 
Roberts, writing for the majority, again cited the holding in 
New York as standing for the principle that Congress may 
not “require the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions” and further noted that “[o]therwise the two-
government system established by the Framers would give 
way to a system that vests power in one central government, 
and individual liberty would suffer.”253 
This lineage of anti-commandeering doctrine Supreme 
Court cases is the cornerstone of New Jersey’s current 
argument before the Court, concerning the 
constitutionality—or lack thereof—of PASPA.254 First, New 
Jersey emphasizes the importance of maintaining the 
prohibition on Congress’ ability to “commandeer” state 
legislatures to our overall federalist system and the division 
of federal and state authority.255 If Congress were allowed to 
dictate the substance of state laws, New Jersey argues, the 
lines of political accountability would be blurred, and state 
legislatures, which, relative to Congress, are better 
positioned to address and answer to the concerns of state 
residents—would be handcuffed and unable to respond to 
their electorates, thereby treading upon individual 
liberties.256 Furthermore, New Jersey contends that 
preventing a state from repealing an existing legal 
prohibition, particularly where the state constituents have 
already democratically expressed their disfavor for that 
prohibition, is just as repugnant to the principles of 
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federalism as a federal directive to enact such a 
prohibition.257 In other words, forcing a state to leave an 
unpopular state law on the books is essentially equivalent to 
ordering the state to pass such a law in the first place. In 
both cases, the state’s constitutionally protected police 
powers are being overridden, even in an area where Congress 
itself has not implemented any sort of federal regulatory 
measure or legislative prohibition.258 
Moreover, New Jersey has made a powerful case that, 
not only does PASPA force the state to leave an unpopular 
law in place, but since much of the state’s original gambling 
prohibition was repealed under the 2014 bill, the federal 
government, operating through PASPA, is actually 
commandeering the state legislature and directing it to 
implement a new law that prohibits gambling within the 
state.259 Therefore, while the Court of Appeals did not feel as 
though PASPA could be deemed commandeering because the 
Court did not view the federal law as requiring any 
affirmative action on the part of the states, in New Jersey’s 
case, it actually would require the affirmative 
implementation of a state law. Additionally, the Court of 
Appeals did not find PASPA to be coercive, and therefore 
constitutional; yet, by invalidating the partial repeal 
attempt, it really leaves the state with no legitimate 
alternative, and certainly not a realistic option, other than 
re-implementing and then maintaining the state law 
prohibition on gambling.260 The only other, seemingly legal, 
alternative would be to eliminate all gambling prohibitions 
within the state, which would be demonstrably reprehensible 
for a multitude of public policy reasons, and therefore really 
not a legitimate choice at all. This public policy rationale, 
alone, indicates the inherent coercion in PASPA, and those 
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underlying policy considerations, coupled with the inability 
to regulate or license gambling within the state, leaves no 
conceivable incentives for the state to move forward with an 
unchecked liberalization of the activity. 
On the other hand, the NCAA and the professional sports 
leagues maintain that PASPA cannot be an example of 
federal commandeering because the law does not command 
New Jersey to take any affirmative legislative or 
enforcement action, and only tells the state what it cannot 
do.261 However, as was previously discussed, the contention 
that PASPA does not direct any state legislative acts is 
rather dubious, particularly in the wake of the 2014 partial 
repeal of the state gambling prohibition. Furthermore, the 
NCAA roots the core of its PASPA defense in the Supremacy 
Clause, and the notion that PASPA is a wholly constitutional 
preemption of conflicting state law, in an area of interstate 
commerce where Congress has the authority to legislate.262 
Yet, this argument is also somewhat questionable, since 
PASPA itself does not implement any federal regulatory or 
enforcement program, nor does it ban gambling; instead, the 
law relies entirely on state gambling prohibitions and state 
enforcement, in order to give it effect. 
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has yet to issue a 
ruling in Murphy; however, based on how both parties’ 
arguments were ostensibly received during oral arguments, 
early indications are that the Court is likely to reverse the 
Court of Appeals’ decision and render a verdict in favor of 
New Jersey.263 In deciding this case, the Court has several 
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options, but given the strong case that New Jersey has 
presented, the likeliest outcomes are that the Court will 
either invalidate PASPA altogether by declaring it to be 
unconstitutional, or, in the alternative, keep the law in place 
while also allowing New Jersey to implement its partial 
repeal.264 Given the conservative majority on the Court, and 
the inherent juxtaposition between the social concerns 
presented by gambling, and the competing fundamental 
federalist interest of allowing states to exercise their 
sovereignty in governance, it is perhaps more likely that the 
Court will hedge to some extent and go with the latter 
approach, thereby allowing PASPA to exist indefinitely, 
while granting states like New Jersey the discretion to 
legislate out from under the law, should they elect to do so. 
However, the momentum behind striking down PASPA 
altogether has certainly never been stronger; as such, a 
Supreme Court determination that the law is wholly 
unconstitutional certainly remains a distinct possibility. 
Such an outcome seems especially conceivable in light of 
the Supreme Court Justices’ apparent receptiveness toward 
New Jersey’s claims with respect to the Tenth 
Amendment.265 To be sure, during oral arguments, Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan all seemed to entertain the 
idea that PASPA was in fact simply a lawful federal 
preemption under the Supremacy Clause.266 However, 
Justice Kagan also seemed to be genuinely concerned that 
there really is no distinction between telling a state they 
must pass a certain law, and telling them they must keep a 
certain law in place.267 Moreover, Justice Kennedy and, 
perhaps most crucially for New Jersey, Justice Breyer, both 
seemed to find the law to be a violation of the anti-
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commandeering doctrine.268 Kennedy, who once famously 
advocated for the import of states’ roles as “laboratories for 
experimentation” under the federalist system,269 
unequivocally expressed his view of New Jersey’s plight 
under PASPA when he stated that the federal law “leaves in 
place a state law that the state does not want, so the citizens 
of the State of New Jersey are bound to obey a law that the 
state doesn’t want but that the federal government compels 
the state to have. That seems commandeering.”270 Kennedy 
also pointed out that laws such as PASPA “blur[ ] political 
accountability” between the states and federal government, 
and that such an outcome is “precisely what federalism is 
designed to prevent.”271 Breyer seemed to agree in matter-of-
factly stating: “the subject matter of this law is the state. 
That’s what this is about, telling states what to do, and 
therefore, it falls within commandeering.”272 Moreover, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both seemed to take issue 
with the fact that the federal government could have 
prohibited gambling itself if it wanted to do so, therefore 
implying that the NCAA’s interpretation of PASPA was 
either incorrect, or that the law itself was overreaching.273 
The Chief Justice was also not at all receptive to the NCAA’s 
suggestion that the State of New Jersey could legalize all 
sports betting if it wanted to, but that it could not partially 
legalize it or regulate it in any way, as that would amount to 
an affirmative authorization; in fact, Roberts incredulously 
asked the Solicitor General, who was arguing on behalf of the 
NCAA, if he had “no problem at all [with] anyone [engaging] 
in any kind of gambling they want, including a twelve-year-
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old going to a casino?”274 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch did not 
seem comfortable with the idea of the federal government 
passing laws that pawned off regulation and enforcement 
responsibilities, and the inherent expenses thereof, onto the 
states.275 Meanwhile, as is typically the case, Justice Thomas 
remained silent during oral arguments, but since he 
generally places great value on the legislative sovereignty of 
states and limitations on the power of the federal 
government, he seems to be a safe bet to also side with New 
Jersey on this issue.276 
Taken together, it certainly seems as though the 
Supreme Court is primed for a landmark decision, in favor of 
both New Jersey and the institution of federalism itself.277 
Even if the Court were to conclude that PASPA is not 
technically a textbook example of commandeering or 
conscripting the state legislature, it is still a facial regulation 
of what the state legislature can and cannot do in the absence 
of a federal regulatory or enforcement program, and 
therefore seemingly an infringement on state sovereignty 
under the Tenth Amendment. Further fueling this 
momentum for leaving states to their legislative devices is 
the current social and political landscape throughout the 
United States. The implications of the looming Supreme 
Court decision will be monumental and extremely broad in 
scope, as a number of other current issues, such as marijuana 
liberalization and the existence of, and federal policies 
toward, sanctuary cities, will greatly depend on the decision 
in Murphy.278 
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In the case of marijuana policy, Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions seems primed to wage war on the states that have 
already decriminalized or overtly legalized marijuana usage, 
to varying degrees.279 A ruling against New Jersey, and in 
favor of PASPA’s constitutionality and legislative reach, in 
Murphy, will bolster Sessions’ authority to dictate state 
marijuana policies and the enforcement thereof, and thereby 
present a tremendous threat to state sovereignty.280 
Moreover, the Trump administration’s current policies 
aimed at punishing “sanctuary cities” that refuse to comply 
with federal immigration laws and enforcement standards, 
by withholding federal funds otherwise earmarked for those 
cities, also seem to be facially coercive practices and flagrant 
violations of the anti-commandeering doctrine.281 However, 
a ruling against New Jersey in Murphy could have huge 
ramifications in terms of reinforcing and validating the 
federal government’s utilization of such practices. The 
Supreme Court Justices are almost certainly aware of the 
implications that would stem from a ruling in favor of the 
NCAA and PASPA, namely that such a verdict would be 
viewed as an implicit endorsement of these other 
contemporaneous federal attempts to exercise influence and 
control within the states, and the inherent dangers thereof. 
Therefore, viewing New Jersey’s anti-commandeering 
argument in light of these other concurrent social and 
political issues seems to further tip the proverbial scales of 
justice in favor of New Jersey’s position. 
Still though, it remains entirely possible that the 
Supreme Court will once again surprise those closely 
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monitoring New Jersey’s ongoing endeavor to surmount the 
obstacles presented by PASPA and somewhat inexplicably 
issue a verdict in favor of the NCAA. Should this occur, it 
would be a huge blow to every state looking to introduce their 
own regulated and licensed state-sponsored sports betting 
regime. Yet, as discouraging as such an outcome would seem 
for the future of liberalized gambling policies, it remains very 
unlikely that the momentum behind relaxing gambling 
restrictions would grind to a halt altogether. An act of 
Congress could still eliminate the impediments presented by 
PASPA once and for all, and the political and social climate 
may be just right for such legislation to pass. Additionally, 
as is seemingly the case with the marijuana liberalization 
saga, when federal officials begin to push back against the 
momentum for loosening restrictions on individual liberty, it 
can actually provide the necessary impetus to put the 
legislative gears in motion, particularly when such policies 
are already gaining wide support at the state level.282 
C. The Landscape for Increased Liberalization, Beyond 
Murphy 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis of the 
dispute surrounding the daily fantasy sports industry in the 
earlier portions of this Comment, it seems safe to conclude 
that daily fantasy sports themselves are, in fact, a form of 
online gambling. This is abundantly evident based on the 
contingencies that are laced throughout the contests, 
including the performance of players, game-time weather 
conditions, and unforeseeable nature of player injuries. 
Furthermore, the companies themselves privately branded 
their products as being akin to traditional gambling 
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operations in their pitches to investors.283 Moreover, at its 
inception, FanDuel (and later DraftKings) admittedly sought 
to replace online poker companies and sportsbooks that were 
indisputably gambling operations, after UIGEA eradicated 
them from the U.S. market, and to this end, the daily fantasy 
model was carefully tailored to UIGEA in order to give the 
initial semblance of legal compliance.284 This confluence of 
facts and events makes it abundantly clear that daily fantasy 
sports is a form of gambling, irrespective of the legislative 
actions that states have taken to the contrary. 
As is the case in New Jersey, PASPA currently prohibits 
the legalization of sports gambling in a total of forty-six 
states; therefore, while defining daily fantasy sports as legal 
“games of skill” is a relatively inventive and convenient way 
to circumvent a legal conflict with PASPA, the reality of the 
situation remains unchanged. To be sure, there is a 
“knowledge” or “skill” element to fantasy sports, which 
manifests itself in the act of selecting players, but once these 
selections are made, a participant’s fate is inextricably 
intertwined with the real-life performance of the selected 
players, something that no daily fantasy participant could 
ever purport to have control over, regardless of their relative 
levels of knowledge and skill. This is similar to the position 
a blackjack player is in at a casino: a certain degree of 
knowledge can help a player to some extent, but only to a 
point. For example, a blackjack player could wisely decide to 
not “hit on 18,” but at that point, the player’s fate is wholly 
removed from his or her control, to be determined only by 
whatever the dealer’s cards end up showing. As such, daily 
fantasy sports would undoubtedly fail to meet an honest 
application of either the “material element test” or the 
“modicum of chance” standard at the state level. Ultimately, 
based on the nature of the contests and aforementioned 
contingencies, daily fantasy sports would almost certainly 
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fail under the “predominant purpose test” as well, though an 
argument to the contrary could at least be invoked under 
that standard. 
Yet, as we have seen, states have increasingly 
demonstrated an encouraging willingness to legalize, 
regulate, and tax daily fantasy sports.285 This provides a 
truly advantageous scenario, under which all parties stand 
to benefit: the daily fantasy industry can endure, if not 
thrive, while the consumer gets much-needed regulatory 
protections, competitive safeguards, and transparency, and 
the states reap the benefits of increased revenue. The fact 
that states are recognizing the benefits of such arrangements 
certainly bodes well for the future of legalized sports betting. 
Equally important in this analysis is the support from the 
professional sports leagues for daily fantasy sports, as these 
leagues will likely have a pivotal role in shaping the 
landscape of a legalized and regulated sports betting 
environment, irrespective of the future impact of PASPA, a 
legislative act which they are primarily responsible for.286 
As has been previously discussed, the judicial outcome in 
New Jersey’s most recent attempt to legalize sports betting 
will largely determine the fate of PASPA, which will in turn 
have ramifications in states throughout the country. As of 
the time of this writing, the states of California, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, and West Virginia have pending legislation to 
introduce legalized sports betting in their respective 
states.287 The current holdup on most of those bills, and the 
reason why none of these states have yet brought a PASPA 
challenge of their own, is that most of the bills are “stand-by 
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bills” that are tied to a future contingency, such as an 
amendment or repeal of PASPA.288 Furthermore, in addition 
to New Jersey, the states of Connecticut, Mississippi, and 
Pennsylvania have already enacted legislation to implement 
legal and regulated sports betting programs.289 
In any event, regardless of the eventual outcome of the 
New Jersey case, federal lawmakers should strongly consider 
the multitude of policy reasons for repealing PASPA, not the 
least of which are the billions of dollars that change hands 
annually, as the direct result of illegal sports betting 
operations. In both 2017 and 2018, the Super Bowl generated 
$4.7 billion in bets, by itself; and an estimated ninety-seven 
percent of these bets were illegally placed, as per the 
American Gaming Association.290 Senator John McCain, 
once a staunch opponent of sports betting, has recently gone 
on record stating that he believes that Congress should 
reconsider the idea of legalizing and regulating sports 
betting.291 
Even the professional sports leagues themselves seem to 
be increasingly supportive of the idea. NBA Commissioner 
Adam Silver surprised many when he voiced his support for 
a legalized, regulated sports betting market. Moreover, the 
NBA and MLB, seemingly in preparation for a gambling-
friendly verdict in Murphy, are actively lobbying at the state 
level for one-percent of state-sponsored sports betting 
revenue to go to the leagues, in the form of an “integrity 
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fee.”292 Such a fee, the leagues argue, would help to regulate 
and enforce transparent, legal gambling operations, and also 
offset any threats to the leagues’ respective images and 
public perceptions.293 Meanwhile, the NHL recently cast 
gambling concerns aside when it introduced the first 
professional sports franchise in Las Vegas, Nevada.294 
Additionally, the NFL has approved the Oakland Raiders’ 
impending move to Las Vegas, with the thirty-two team 
owners overwhelmingly lending their support, as evidenced 
by the 31-1 vote on the proposed relocation.295 
Furthering this momentum for repealing or modifying 
PASPA was the 2016 election of President Donald J. Trump, 
once a casino owner, himself.296 As the president of the 
American Gaming Association, Geoff Freeman, phrased it: 
“[there is] a perfect storm coming together . . . everyone is 
acknowledging that we are better off having a regulated 
environment.”297 Furthermore, the ongoing constitutional 
questions surrounding PASPA, in conjunction with the 
Republican Party’s traditional beliefs in state’s rights and 
empowering state legislatures, and the fact that Republicans 
now control both Congress and the Executive Branch at 
minimum until 2019, makes the legislative environment 
very conducive to passing legislation to legalize sports 
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betting.298 For his part, Trump stated in 2015 that he is “OK 
with [sports betting and daily fantasy sports] because it’s 
happening anyway. Whether you have [legalized sports 
betting] or you don’t have it, you have it.”299 As such, 
notwithstanding the still unknown outcome of Murphy v. 
NCAA, it is entirely possible, if not altogether likely, that 
significant steps will be taken toward legalized sports 
betting in the United States, over the next several years. 
CONCLUSION 
Today, the two leading daily fantasy sports companies 
are still reeling as they attempt to recover from the stunning 
events that catapulted their industry into legal turmoil and 
pushed the two billion-dollar companies to the brink of 
dissolution; however, the future suddenly looks bright for the 
daily fantasy industry, once again. It will likely never be 
what it once was, as it is almost inconceivable to envision 
FanDuel and DraftKings ever engaging in marketing wars 
in which they air commercials every ninety seconds and 
openly boast of the millions of dollars they planned to give 
away during a given week. In fact, the once bitter rivals were 
at one point actively negotiating a humbling merger deal 
designed to help the two companies recover and thrive again, 
prior to federal regulators blocking the proposed merger 
plan, due to monopolistic and market share concerns.300 
However, while the recovery process may be slow, especially 
with the merger option now off the table, FanDuel and 
DraftKings seem primed to lead the industry into the future, 
using their growing legal foothold to regain lost prominence 
and expand their operations. Recently, in an effort to keep 
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pace with market evolution and innovation, FanDuel even 
introduced contests in which winners were paid in the 
cryptocurrencies “Bitcoin” and “Dash.”301 
Though it seems clear that daily fantasy sports products 
are simply the latest variation of gambling, legalizing and 
regulating the activity is the prudent move. This proposition 
is plainly reflected and reinforced by the history of gambling 
laws in the United States, over the course of the last half-
century. First, the Wire Act sought to eradicate illegal horse 
racing operations that relied on telegraph, and later, 
telephone communications.302 However, other forms of 
gambling subsequently increased in popularity, before the 
advent of the Internet eventually gave rise to online 
sportsbooks and poker sites. In response, the UIGEA 
effectively eliminated these illicit activities, only to be 
thwarted for several more years by the inception of the daily 
fantasy sports industry, which developed to fill the void. The 
trend is ostensibly well-established by now: with each 
subsequent piece of legislation seeking to end black market 
gambling, technological advancements and human ingenuity 
devise a way to circumvent the law, and the cycle continues. 
Therefore, it seems to be the logical option to simply 
allow daily fantasy participants to continue enjoying daily 
fantasy sports, with the protections that state and 
government regulatory agencies can provide. It remains to 
be seen which states will become the next to affirm the 
legality of the daily fantasy companies’ operations, but given 
the strong momentum for legalization, the growing number 
of states who have already passed legalizing bills, and the 
incentives for simultaneously enhancing consumer 
safeguards, while increasing state revenues, it should not 
take long for the next state to take an affirmative stance, 
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with respect to daily fantasy sports. 
Meanwhile, there is a growing impetus for following a 
similar path of legalization and regulation on the 
concomitant issue of sports betting in the United States. 
With political leaders, professional sports leagues, and state 
governments showing historic and amalgamated support for 
eradicating the black market for sports betting, an ongoing 
challenge to the constitutionality of the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act before the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and the developing legality of daily fantasy sports 
serving as both a catalyst and guidepost, a significant step 
toward liberalizing the current prohibitions on professional 
sports wagering appears to be imminent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editor’s Note: This Comment was selected from our 2016–17 Note & 
Comment competition. Simultaneous with its publishing, the Su-
preme Court released its decision in Murphy v. NCAA. As expected, 
the Court ultimately did rule in favor of New Jersey on May 14, 2018, 
striking down the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act 
in Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. ___, Nos. 16-476, 16-477, 2017 WL 
684747 (2018). 
